Item – Theses Canada

​
OCLC number
910774485
Link(s) to full text
LAC copy
LAC copy
Author
Lockhart, Michael David,1967-
Title
Epistemic Value Pluralism.
Degree
Ph. D. -- University of Alberta, 2012
Publisher
Ottawa : Library and Archives Canada = Bibliothèque et Archives Canada, [2013]
©2012
Description
2 microfiches
Notes
Includes bibliographical references.
Abstract
<?Pub Inc> Philosophers have, for the most part, taken for granted that all epistemic value is derived from the truth goal. Despite the recent development of virtue epistemology and its promise to reframe traditional problems, epistemic value monism remains largely unchallenged. I argue that once one conceptually prioritises agents over beliefs as virtue theories purport to do, value pluralism is implied. In fact, monism becomes increasingly implausible once we acknowledge that the primary object of evaluation is a situated, embodied, embedded, and bounded agent. My arguments take two forms. First, I distinguish between veridical virtues and virtues of epistemic usefulness. Where the former aim at the truth goal, the latter does not. I argue that there are both commonsense and paradoxical virtues of epistemic usefulness that intellectual exemplars exhibit that cannot be accounted for under monism. Second, I argue that two prominent views in epistemology that claim to reject monism are suspiciously myopic and that a full commitment to pluralism is better-equipped to handle many traditional topics in epistemology such as the value problem, understanding, epistemic autonomy and responsibility, and wisdom.
ISBN
9780494878903
0494878908